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Jewish Power in America: Myth and Reality. By Henry L. Feingold. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2008. xiv + 164 pp.
In 2007, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer published The Israel 
Lobby, claiming that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) and its neoconservative allies were misshaping American foreign 
policy in accordance with Israeli interests. In Jewish Power in America, 
Henry L. Feingold, an elder statesman among historians of the American 
Jewish experience, offers a counter-polemic. He identifies the belief in 
American Jews’ outsized influence with the age-old antisemitic conspiracy 
theory that Jews constitute a demonic cabal. Through case studies of 
American Jews’ historical attempts to exercise political power, Feingold 
demonstrates that the conspiracy theory misunderstands the nature of 
Jews’ power and the extent of their influence. He argues that American 
Jews have been able, to a limited extent, to exercise “ideational” or 
“soft” power—basically, moral suasion carried out through effective 
organization and public relations campaigns. Yet their soft power has 
succeeded only when there has been a “confluence of interests” between 
Jewish goals and American national priorities (36). Where such a conflu-
ence did not exist, American Jews’ best efforts have failed to gain their 
political ends. 
American Jews have succeeded at times in influencing the political 
process, he argues, because they have mastered the skills of democratic 
organizing, training generations of activists coming up through the intri-
cate system of communal affairs. Groups like the National Conference 
for Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) were successful, for example, in convincing the 
American people that the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate would be a 
key sign of the success of American Cold War politics, consonant with 
the nation’s values and interests. This public relations success enabled 
NCSJ to work with Richard Perle, a member of Senator Henry Jackson’s 
staff and a key figure among the neoconservatives, to draft and gain 
support for the Jackson-Vanik amendment linking Jewish emigration to 
the U.S.S.R.’s obtaining Most Favored Nation trade status.
Influence depends on confluence. Hence, American Jews’ success is 
conditional. Despite some Jews’ high profile positions in the Roosevelt 
administration and the community’s disproportionate support for the 
social welfare state—called by antisemitic wags at the time the “Jew 
Deal”—Jews’ soft power was ineffective during World War II in persuad-
ing Roosevelt to enter the war earlier to stop the Holocaust. Roosevelt 
did not believe most Americans would see intervening in Europe to save 
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Jews as a reason to go to war. Even during the Soviet Jewry campaign, 
American Jews’ influence was limited; during the Nixon administration, 
Henry Kissinger argued that pressing the U.S.S.R. on Jews’ human rights 
interfered with the détente policy. Again, while the Israel lobby has used 
the American political process effectively to advocate for aid, political 
cover, and weaponry, it has never been as effective as the exaggerated 
narrative suggests. Jews were unable to prevent the sale of AWACs 
technology to Saudi Arabia or Hawk missiles to Jordan or to convince 
the U.S. to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital (73). Feingold points 
to recent flare-ups between US and Israeli officials with regard to the 
war in Iraq (Israelis thought the focus should have been on Iran) and 
the West Bank settlements to suggest that the alliance of mutual interests 
is not unassailable. 
Even the Jews’ most successful projections of their interests on the 
national stage do not signify the kind of unity that the myth of hyper 
Jewish power imagines. Feingold calls attention to Jews’ internal faction-
alism due to the varying aims of the alphabet soup of organizations. He 
explains that during the Soviet emigration debacle, the Israeli government 
clashed with American Jewish agencies like the Joint Distribution Com-
mittee over the question of whether Soviet Jews should be compelled to 
immigrate to Israel or be permitted to “drop out” of aliyah and immigrate 
to the U.S. Feingold points out that no organization can be considered 
the representative voice of American Jewry. Whether the group is AIPAC, 
the American Jewish Committee, or the Conference of the Presidents of 
Major American Jewish Organizations, the mandate of their leaders is 
only to speak for their group’s interests. President Roosevelt may have 
called Rabbi Stephen Wise the Jewish pope, but Feingold makes clear 
that the United Jewish Communities’ slogan “We Are One” has become 
mere fodder for intracommunal jokes.
If even the avowedly Jewish organizations do not present a unified 
front, Feingold asks, how is it possible to see more general political 
movements like the New Left and the neoconservative movement as 
Jewish? He points out that most Jews in these movements have had only 
vague affiliations, if any, with Jewish ideology or organization. Moreover, 
he claims that to identify Jewish power with either radicalism or neo-
conservatism is misleading because both of these political movements 
are more extreme than the majority of American Jews, who hew to a 
position “slightly left of center” (86). 
Feingold offers no social-scientific evidence to support this claim, in 
keeping with the sparse scholarly apparatus of the book as a whole—one 
of the indications that the book aims to reach beyond the academy. The 
tone also suggests a broader aim and personal investment. The chapters 
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on the New Left and the neoconservatives sometimes speak of Jews in the 
first person plural, rather than the third person typical of historical stud-
ies, and veer toward sarcasm, as if to imply that Feingold does not want 
middle-of-the-road liberal Jews to be tarred with the extremist brush.
The book has one conceptual limitation: it does not posit a satisfy-
ing historical explanation for the theory of inordinate American Jewish 
power. Feingold argues that the source of this theory “remains a mystery 
whose roots may lie in prehistoric myths and fears,” as exemplified by 
the ancient deicide charge, and the myth of the Elders of Zion (117). 
Yet identifying the recent animus against the Israel lobby with a prime-
val antisemitism obscures the motivation of those groups who express 
it, such as the anti-Zionist coalition in the international community, or 
the activists and scholars whose sympathy with the Palestinian cause 
sometimes leads to knee-jerk anti-Zionism, or those who see Israel as an 
obstacle to peace. Where the stakes are so high, it is no great mystery 
why some members of these groups have adopted a spurious explanation. 
They will use any means to discredit current Jewish political aims. One 
does not expect a historian to resort to a “prehistoric” theory of Jew 
hatred. Feingold needs only to correct the record, as he does splendidly 
in this important book.
Michael Galchinsky
Georgia State University
Race and Religion among the Chosen Peoples of Crown Heights. By Henry Goldschmidt. 
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006. xi + 281 pp.
This sometimes gripping ethnography begins with a wonderful vignette 
about misunderstanding between blacks and Jews—“intimate strang-
ers”—in a hot, sweltering laundromat in Crown Heights, Brooklyn (6). 
The rest of the book unpacks how these two groups, Lubavitch Hasidim 
and mainly West Indians, who clashed so violently in 1991, make sense 
of their differences. Whiteness in Crown Heights, unlike elsewhere in 
the United States, is uniquely Jewish. But the Jews of Crown Heights 
see themselves as Jews, not whites. For them, the neighborhood con-
sists of besieged Jews living amid aggressive Gentiles. Yet West Indians 
recognize a different neighborhood: disempowered blacks segregated 
from privileged whites. This difference, argues Goldschmidt, makes a 
difference. The thesis of the book is that Crown Height disrupts any 
simplistic or essentialized classifications of sameness and difference in 
contemporary America.
